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 “…the traditional schooling system is not an
option that many incumbent workers or firms use
when facing the need to upgrade their skills. As a
result, the provision (or non-provision) of employ-
er-provided training is a key factor determining
how much and what kind of skill upgrading
occurs within firms and across workers.”
– Lynch and Black (1998: 65)
This paper explores the most recent research
on the economic benefits arising from com-
pany-provided training. More precisely, it
reviews the empirical literature in its search
for answers to the following policy-relevant
questions: What kinds of training do compa-
nies provide? Who is trained, to what extent,
and for which reasons? Do trained employees
experience an earnings advantage over the
non-trained? Does training enhance employ-
ability, job mobility, and promotion? Does
the company benefit from its training invest-
ments in terms of improved productivity,
competitiveness, and profitability? Does the
economy and society at large benefit from
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their labour?
This non-technical review is far from
comprehensive. It may rather be described as
the tip of the iceberg, with an emphasis on
some of the most recent empirical research
on company-provided training and its
economic implications for employees, the
company, and society.1 Since the primary
focus is on hard empirical evidence, theoreti-
cal and methodological aspects are only
briefly mentioned.2 Moreover, although the
review focuses on company training, it never-
theless mostly ignores the existing literature
on apprenticeship training. It also omits, for
the most part, the complex issue of training
those with only low-level skills.3 Also, this
review does not provide descriptive statistics
across countries. Such information has been
extensively surveyed by Nestler and Kailis
(2002a,b,c,d,e) and the OECD (1994, 1999,
2003), among others.
The first training decision that a company
has to make is not necessarily concerned with
whom to train. Instead, the company needs
to start by considering whether to buy the
new skills they require in the labour market
by hiring properly skilled labour, or whether
it is preferable to acquire the new skills by
training the company’s present staff. If the
company decides to invest in its current
personnel, then it is faced with a multitude of
highly interrelated questions: Who are to be
trained? What kind of training is needed?
How extensive is the training to be? Is there a
big risk that employees will be lured away by
competitors once trained? Of these ques-
tions, the empirical literature has paid con-
siderable attention to trying to unravel which
personal and company characteristics most
strongly influence the probability that an
employee will participate in employer-pro-
vided training (the incidence of training).
Considerably less is known about the deter-
minants of the extent of the training (the
intensity of training). 
After the training investment has been
made, logically the focus turns to the effects
of the training. As will become evident in the
following discussion, there has been very
little research to date on the impact of train-
ing on the trained employees and their non-
trained colleagues, on the performance of the
training company, and, in the last resort, on
social welfare. Moreover, the vast majority of
existing research has been restricted to the
UK or the USA.
General versus specific company
training
The confusion about definitions which
characterises the literature on company
training also extends to the traditional
division of company training into general
and specific training.4 Moreover, this topic
has received considerable attention in recent
years.
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1.  For comprehensive reviews of previous evidence, see e.g. Lynch (1994a,b), Ashenfelter and Lalonde (1996),
Booth and Snower (1996), Bishop (1997). More recent work has been reviewed by e.g. Asplund and Pereira
(1999), Blundell et al. (1999) and Ok and Tergeist (2003). Also noteworthy is the critical contribution by 
Ashton and Green (1996). 
2. For a recent survey of the theoretical training literature, see Leuven (2004).
3. This issue was recently covered in a special issue of The International Journal of Manpower (Asplund and
Salverda, 2004).
4. General training enhances productivity at the company providing the training, as well as at (some) other
companies. Specific training, at the other extreme, raises the productivity of the trainee at the current employ-
er only. The theoretical literature on training has
departed from the pioneering contributions
by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), who
drew a basic line between general and firm-
specific training. While employees them-
selves need to pay for their general training,
companies are usually willing to share both
the costs and the benefits arising from invest-
ments in firm-specific training with their
employees. When sharing is optimal, the
firm-specific investments of the two parties
are also optimal, while at the same time, the
risks of human capital losses due to quits or
layoffs are reduced (Hashimoto, 1981).
However, recent research does not lend
support for this traditional theoretical view. A
growing number of studies suggest that
companies provide their employees with a
considerable amount of general training, and
also pay for this training. Using US data on
youth, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998,
1999) found that employers pay for nearly all
off-the-job company training, of which a
large portion appears to be essentially
general. Data from the International Adult
Literacy Survey (IALS) indicate that com-
pany training received off-the-job imparts
mainly general skills but is, nevertheless,
mostly paid for by the employer (OECD,
2003). Likewise, European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) data reveal that
European employers tend to pay for training
that can be considered to generate skills of a
more general nature (Booth and Bryan,
2002).
A rapidly expanding theoretical literature
is attempting to identify the conditions
under which companies are willing to
sponsor general training, while empirical
evidence in support of the predictions
derived from these theoretical models is only
just starting to emerge. A few recent contri-
butions are referenced below, all of which
contain reviews of the previous literature in
the field of employer-supported general
training.5 But before turning to these studies,
the question has been put forward whether it
is meaningful to distinguish between general
and specific company training. Lazear (2003)
argued that there is no firm-specific training.
Instead, all skills can be seen to be essentially
general in the sense that they are used by
other companies as well. It is only the com-
position of the skills in a company and the
weights that this particular company attaches
to each skill that generate specificity. He also
provided empirical support for this ‘skill-
weights’ view.6
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) developed
a theoretical model that departs from the
assumption that a company has superior
information about the abilities of its em-
ployees and, consequently, ex-post-informa-
tional monopsony power relative to other
potential employers.7Their adverse selection-
based model results in multiple equilibria
where, at the one extreme, the employer
provides and pays for considerable amounts
of general training due to a low quitting rate.
At the other extreme, employee turnover is
endogenously high and, accordingly, the
company’s monopsony power is low, as well
as its willingness to train. Moreover, their
predictions of there being adverse selection
among those receiving company-provided
training, as well as of companies having
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5.  Also see e.g. Barron, Berger and Black (1999) as well as Booth and Bryan (2002).
6. For other relevant theoretical contributions on general versus specific investments in company training, see e.g.
Oosterbeek, Sloof and Sonnemans (2001) and Kessler and Lülfesmann (2002).
7. Previous theoretical work relied on the assumption of asymmetric information about the amount of the train-
ing investment (e.g. Katz and Ziderman, 1990; Chang and Wang, 1996).monopsony power over those who stay,
receive support from wage comparisons
between German large-company apprentices
who differ in their quitting behaviour.
Building on the imperfect information
argument, Booth and Zoega (2000) put forth
a further rationale for companies to invest in
the general skills of their workforce. In
particular, they argued that if the productivi-
ty of an employee depends on the quality of
his or her colleagues, then this particular
ability of the company to stimulate the
productivity of its employees beyond what
they could perform elsewhere will provide
the company with some monopsony power
in the labour market. When enjoying such
monopsony power, the company is also
willing to invest in the general training of its
workforce. This monopsony power is shown
to increase in the average quality of the
company’s labour as measured by its capacity
to undertake complex working tasks, imply-
ing that the company’s incentive to invest in
training that is general to the industry
increases with its task complexity. Hence, the
more stimulating the working environment
is, the more sophisticated are the working
tasks undertaken, the stronger is the em-
ployee’s loyalty to the present employer, and
the higher are the employer’s profits, since
the marginal effect of the training investment
on productivity exceeds that on wages. In
other words, the company benefits more
from the investment than the trained
employee.
Booth and Zoega (2000) noted that their
model receives support from empirical
studies in the USA. In particular, they
referred to Lynch and Black (1998), who
showed that the incidence of computer skills
and teamwork training in US establishments
is positively associated with the average
educational level of the establishment, as well
as with its use of high-performance work
practices. The Lynch–Black study is also
interesting in that these more general types of
training programmes are found to be more
likely in large establishments and in those
with low employee turnover. These con-
clusions agree with those drawn by Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998) concerning apprentice-
ship programmes in large German com-
panies.
A situation of asymmetric information
also underlies the model proposed and tested
by Autor (2001). More specifically, he
addressed the question of why a majority of
US temporary help supply companies offer –
in sharp contradiction with the competitive
model of training – nominally free and un-
restricted computer skills training to their
employees. His model predicts, and the
empirical data confirm, that general training
is provided to induce self-selection among
applicants (attract employees of higher un-
observed ability), as well as to screen the
ability of the employees that are trained. In
addition to providing spot market labour,
temporary help supply companies thus also
sell information to their clients about the
quality of the temporary help employees. The
author concluded that the rapid growth of
temporary help supply employment is
suggestive of increasing demand for arrange-
ments to screen employees for permanent
employment.
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003), on the
other hand, deviated entirely from the asym-
metric information condition and relied
instead on the requirement of imperfect
product market competition as a generator of
company-sponsored general training in an
economy with endogenous turnover. Since
the most important conditions of their model
relate to the training technology and the
toughness of product market competition,
multiple equilibria may emerge also in their
modelling framework. In particular, the
50 Rita Asplundauthors hypothesised that the probability of
general training in an industry increases if the
concentration is high (or competition
sufficiently soft), the returns on training
decrease fast enough for labour turnover to
be avoided, and the differentiation in prod-
ucts is sufficiently strong. Because of the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria, government
intervention may be socially desirable, they
concluded. 
Apart from the asymmetric information
rationale, mainly linked to young people,
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, 1999b) devel-
oped also another line of reasoning for com-
panies to invest in the more general skills of
their employees. In particular, they explored
the bilateral monopoly situation in wage
determination that is likely to arise due to
labour market frictions such as transaction
costs and imperfect information on 
employee ability and/or effort. This bargain-
ing will compress the wage structure relative
to productivity and thus induces the com-
pany to also pay for skills that are portable
across employers. The lower the wages of the
employees compared to their productivity
and the slower the increase in wages com-
pared to rises in productivity, the higher is
the incentive of companies to invest in and
also pay for the general training of their
employees. The two authors provided a com-
prehensive review of the relevant empirical
literature, especially for Germany and the
USA, in the search for evidence in support of
the predictions of their non-competitive
theoretical model.
More formally and simplified, the
Acemoglu–Pischke model can be outlined as
follows, using a simple two-period model and
with the focus on general training. At time t
= 0, with an initial production normalised to
y0, the employer or the employee decides
independently about the amount to invest in
the employee’s general skills, τ.  The corre-
sponding costs of the training are c(τ) = 
cemployer + cemployee. At time t = 1, the employee
either stays with the employer or quits. If the
employee stays, (s)he will produce output 
y1 = f(τ) at a wage rate w(τ).8 If (s)he quits,
(s)he will receive an outside wage equal to
v(τ). The existence of labour market frictions
results in a situation where the employee’s
outside wage option is lower than his or her
marginal product at the current employer,
that is, v(τ) <  f(τ). The consequent surplus,
f(τ) – v(τ), can be shared between the
employer and the employee. The outcome of
this sharing depends on the bargaining power
of the employee (β ∈[0,1]), and will affect
his or her actual wage at the current employ-
er in the second period. Assuming Nash
bargaining, the equilibrium wage of the
second period will be:
(1) w(τ) = v(τ) +β [ f(τ) – v(τ)],
which reveals the critical role of the outside
wage option.
The employer’s interest in providing and
paying for the general training of its employ-
ees is determined by the economic benefits
that it can reap from the investment.
Accordingly, the employer chooses τ in order
to maximise its profits, π,
(2) π(τ) = [f(τ) – w(τ)] – c(τ) = 
(1 – β)[ f(τ) – v(τ)] – c(τ).
The first-order conditions of equation (2)
are:
(3) (1 – β)[ f´(τ) – v´(τ)] – c´(τ) = 0.
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8.  The training technology is assumed to be general, implying that f(τ) is the same for all employers.This model reduces to the case of a perfectly
competitive labour market if f´(τ) – v´(τ) = 0.
Put differently, f(τ )= w(τ)= v(τ), implying
that the employer will not bear any of the
costs arising from investments in the general
training of employees. As noted above, a pre-
condition for the employer to contribute to
such investments is that the initial wage of
the employee is lower than his or her pro-
ductivity, and that this gain of the employer
increases with training. This surplus
condition with respect to outside wages, 
f´(τ) – v´(τ)  > 0, generates external wage
compression, which translates into internal
wage compression, f´(τ) – w´(τ) > 0, as well.
One crucial implication of the presence of
labour market frictions is that investment in
general training will be lower than the social-
ly optimal level, which Becker (1964) showed
could be achieved in a perfectly competitive
labour market. In other words, labour market
imperfections cause τ to be lower than τ*.
Bassanini and Brunello (2003) proposed
and undertook an alternative test of the
Acemoglu–Pischke hypothesis that wage
compression encourages employer provision
and sponsoring of general training. More
specifically, they suggested that employees be
partitioned into relatively homogeneous clus-
ters, for which the training incidence and the
training wage premium are calculated. Based
on training data from the 1996 wave of the
ECHP for seven countries, restricted to male
employees aged 30 to 60 working full-time in
the non-agricultural private sector, they
found the correlation between training
incidence and training wage premiums to be
significantly negative, although rather small
in size. In other words, their results lent
support to the hypothesis that higher wage
compression induces employers to provide
and pay for general training. Peraita (2001),
in contrast, obtained no support for the
Acemoglu–Pischke model when testing it in
Spain using 1994 ECHP data. His conclu-
sion was essentially based on the following
reasoning: Although Spain is top-ranked
when it comes to regulated labour markets,
and is characterised by a highly-compressed
wage structure, the country’s figures for
company-sponsored training are poor, espe-
cially for the unskilled and the less educated
workforce.
In this context, a conceptual aspect
deserves attention. More specifically, in an
extension of the Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999a, 1999b) approach, Booth and Zoega
(2001) showed that wage compression – as
commonly understood in the literature –
does not constitute a necessary condition for
companies to provide general training, while
the Acemoglu–Pischke definition of wage
compression does. They argued that compa-
nies can also gain from sponsoring general
training for their employees in the absence of
(relative) wage compression, as measured by
the ratio of productivity to wages, as long as
the (absolute) gains in wages are below the
(absolute) gains in productivity. Hence,
Booth and Zoega (2001) chose to call the
wage compression of Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999a, 1999b) ‘absolute wage compression’
in order to distinguish it from ‘normal’
(relative) wage compression. More formally,
while absolute wage compression occurs
when the profits per employee in absolute
terms are increasing in training, that is, f´(τ)
– w´(τ) > 0, relative wage compression occurs
when the ratio of output to wages is increas-
ing in training. Booth and Zoega (2001)
noted, though, that although not being a
necessary condition, (relative) wage compres-
sion induced by labour market institutions
may nevertheless make companies more
willing to pay for general training, thus
raising the overall level of company-
sponsored general training. A similar point
was made by Brunello and Medio (2001),
52 Rita Asplundwho developed a simple search equilibrium
model in an attempt to explain the stylised
differences in education and workplace train-
ing prevailing between Germany, Japan, and
the USA.  
Various labour market institutions,
especially minimum wages and trade unions,
have been shown to give rise to similar situa-
tions as that produced by the non-compe-
titive wage compression argument, but with
the additional feature of improving the
general company training position also for
low-wage employees. Acemoglu and Pischke
(2003) empirically analysed the impact of
state and federal increases in the minimum
wage in the USA between 1987 and 1992 on
the company-sponsored training of low-wage
employees. Their results suggested that the
employees that were affected by the mini-
mum wage increase received the same or even
slightly more training. Since they obtained
no support for the idea of minimum wages
reducing the level of company-sponsored
training, they concluded that this finding
may provide part of the explanation for why
European countries, with a variety of legal
and union-imposed wage floors, tend to have
more well-trained workforces than the USA.9
However, one shortcoming of the analysis,
also noted by the authors themselves, is that
it focused on formal training, whereas infor-
mal training might be much more important
in low-wage jobs. Moreover, a closer look at
other recent evidence on the impact of mini-
mum wages on training incidence reveals that
the available evidence is highly contradic-
tory10. Bassanini and Brunello (2003), for
instance, hypothesise that this is due to diffi-
culties related to a proper definition of the
treatment versus control groups, as well as of
the time horizon. Cross-country differences
in the degree of labour market imperfections
are also seen to add to the ambiguity of the
existing results.
In a similar vein, Booth, Francesconi and
Zoega (2003) found for a panel of British
full-time male employees, that trade unions
enhance both the incidence and the intensity
of general training for union-covered com-
pared to non-union-covered employees. On
the other hand, they also noted that their
data was biased towards more formal train-
ing, and that informal training may affect
non-union employees differently from
unionised employees. A more adequate data
coverage of company-sponsored training
might, accordingly, weaken the advantageous
position found for unionised relative to non-
unionised employees.
All in all, the predictions of the standard
theory seem to be at odds with reality. As
indicated above, a number of recent empiri-
cal analyses have lent support to the hypo-
thesis that labour market imperfections
restricting the mobility of workers in combi-
nation with the possibility for employers to
earn rents on their trained employees make
companies willing to invest also in the more
general skills of their workforce. The existing
empirical evidence suggests that companies
do – and should – provide and pay for gener-
al training. This seems to support the
hypothesis that due to more compressed
wages, European companies seem to be more
willing to bear the costs for general training
than US companies.
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9.  In a recent paper, Pischke (2004) used this outcome as part of an explanation for rising wage inequality in the
USA, but relatively stable wage structures in Europe in the 1980s.
10. See e.g. Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2004a) for the UK; Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) and Neumark and
Wascher (2001) for the USA.Incidence and intensity of company
training
11
A widely established contention, supported
by aggregate statistics, is that the probability
of receiving employer-provided training
increases substantially with the individual
employee’s level of education. This positive
association between the acquired formal
education and subsequent training has also
received strong support in empirical analyses
based on individual-level as well as employer-
level data. Moreover, a recent study of ten EU
countries (Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan,
2003a) showed that this complementarity
between training and education holds for
both men and women. The strong positive
association between education and training
inclined Bartel and Sicherman (1995) to
argue that one way of dampening the effect
would be to make the process of learning new
skills simpler, since this could create a relative
increase in the value of time spent in training
for the less-educated.  
On the other hand, Oosterbeek (1998),
argued that the positive correlation between
formal education and company training is
simply due to the omission of ability and self-
selection problems in the undertaken analy-
ses; better-educated individuals reap a higher
return on their investments in training and
have, as a consequence, a stronger preference
for training than less-educated individuals.
His results point to no significant correlation
between education and training on the
employers’ side. In other words, for the com-
pany, it is irrelevant whether it trains its bet-
ter- or less-educated employees. Similar find-
ings were reported by the OECD (2003) in
the sense that the lower incidence and inten-
sity of company training of less-educated
employees as compared to their more 
educated counterparts seem demand- rather
than supply-driven. More specifically, while
the supply of training (by employers) shows
no variation with the educational level of
employees, the less-educated reveal a much
lower demand for training than the better-
educated.
A characteristic closely related to em-
ployees’ formal education is their occupation-
al and/or hierarchical status. A broad-based
generalisation of the existing evidence is that
both the incidence and the intensity of
company-sponsored formal training vary
considerably across occupations, and typical-
ly increase when moving up the hierarchical
ladder.12 The empirical evidence offers few, if
any, explanations for these differences. One
potential reason is that training needs are
very different in different occupations and at
different hierarchical levels. Alternatively, the
need to supplement skills learned in school
may differ across occupations and hierarchi-
cal levels, a reasoning that might also apply
across industries.
There is, however, empirical evidence that
contrasts sharply with these contentions.
Using data on young males in US manu-
facturing industries, Bartel and Sicherman
(1998) found no occupational differences in
training incidence across production workers
employed in manufacturing industries with
very low levels of technological change. At
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11.  Apart from the studies mentioned in this section, further evidence on the incidence and intensity of company
training can be found in, among others, the following contributions: Blundell, Dearden and Meghir (1996),
Barron, Berger and Black (1997), Pannenberg (1997), Arulampalam and Booth (1998), Lynch and Black (1998),
Frazis, Gittleman and Joyce (2000), Goux and Maurin (2000), Brunello (2001), Pischke (2001) and Kucku-
lenz and Zwick (2003).
12. See e.g. Pischke (2001) for an illustrative example on Germany.higher levels of technological change, on the
other hand, craftsmen received significantly
more formal training than other production
workers. Among non-production workers, in
contrast, clerical and unskilled workers
received the least training in industries with
low levels of technological change, but the
most training in industries characterised by
high rates of technological change. Since the
category of clerical workers covers occupa-
tions heavily affected by the introduction of
computers, these findings can be interpreted
as providing indirect evidence that com-
panies experiencing rapid technological
change also pay for investment in the more
general skills of their workforce, including
the low-skilled. The OECD (2003), in con-
trast, reported that the training supplied by
employers’ fell well short of employee
demands, especially in the case of employees
in low-skilled occupations and employees
with low literacy. However, the report did not
discuss how these outcomes link to the afore-
mentioned OECD conclusion that there is
no bias against the low-educated when it
comes to employer-provided training.
Since men and women are typically inves-
tigated separately when it comes to training,
there is notably more information on gender
differences in training participation rates
than on gender per se as a determinant of the
incidence and intensity of training. The
OECD (2003) found no significant differ-
ences in training participation rates between
male and female employees.13 A similar find-
ing was reported by Arulampalam, Booth
and Bryan (2003a) for six out of the ten EU
countries analysed based on ECHP data. For
four of the countries, women were found to
be more likely than men to participate in
training. 
However, when exploring what deter-
mines participation in training, the outcome
typically looks quite different. Country-
specific studies often indicate that being a
woman means a significantly lower proba-
bility of receiving company training and, if
participating, the length of training is likely
to be significantly shorter than that for men.
Moreover, when decomposing the likelihood
of training participation for men and
women, Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan
(2003a) noted that similarity in the overall
training incidence across the two sexes com-
monly hides opposing effects of characteris-
tics and returns to these characteristics.
Gender gaps in the probability of participa-
tion in training, in turn, appear to be variably
due to different characteristics of men and
women, on the one hand, and to differing
returns to similar characteristics, on the other
hand.
The Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan
(2003a) study revealed, in effect, several
interesting training similarities and dissimi-
larities between European men and women
aged 25 to 54 in non-agricultural em-
ployment. First, there seems to be a strong
negative correlation between age and the
probability of receiving formal work-related
training for men, but not for women. The
authors interpreted this result as evidence
that women have a higher probability of
experiencing lifelong learning over their
entire working career. Second, fixed-term
employment contracts tend to induce a lower
training probability for men in five of the ten
EU countries under study, but for women in
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13.  There is a clear gender gap in the intensity of training, though.
14. As shown in a recent study for Sweden (Wallette, 2004), the training outcome may, however, vary quite sub-
stantially depending on the type of temporary job held. A distinction between five types of temporary jobs
(probationary, project, replacement, on-call, and other temporary jobs) reveals that, while the incidence of 
continueonly two of the countries.14The authors drew
attention especially to the results for Finland,
which point to a significantly negative associ-
ation between fixed-term contracts and train-
ing for both men and women. Moreover, the
Finnish results also point to a significantly
negative relationship between part-time work
and training, although for Finnish men
only.15 Thus, the authors argued, in Finland
there are clear signs of a mechanism at work
that may affect the country’s human capital
acquisition. Third, both men and women are,
on average, more likely to receive training if
employed in the public sector. Finally, as
already noted above, the positive correlation
between training and education is strong for
both genders across Europe. 
Oosterbeek (1998) argued that the
observed bias towards men might well be
explained by the higher probability that
women will experience career interruption,
which makes training investment in women
more risky from the company’s point-of-
view. Lynch and Black (1998), on the other
hand, stated that the documented gender
differences may be largely driven by the
analyses overlooking the fact that gender
composition is likely to vary with the charac-
teristics of the employer. They found, for
instance, that the larger the proportion of
female employees in US manufacturing
establishments, the greater the proportion of
employees trained.
Theoretically, unions may encourage
either more or less training. The existing
evidence, mostly for the UK and the USA,
seems to be equally inconclusive. While a
number of British studies suggest that union-
covered employees have both a higher
incidence and a higher intensity of training
than their non-union counterparts16, a recent
study by Addison and Belfield (2004:16)
found no “…simple effect of unions on train-
ing incidence, duration, or coverage”. Frazis,
Gittleman and Joyce (2000), in contrast,
reported non-unionised US establishments to
be more likely to provide their employees
with training than their unionised counter-
parts.
Larger companies are much more likely to
provide their employees with formal training
than are smaller companies. In addition, the
extent of training tends to be positively
related to the size of the employer. Several
potential explanations for this divergence in
training provision between differently-sized
employers have been put forth in the litera-
ture, but none of them has been subject to
rigorous empirical tests. Among these ex-
planations are higher training-related fixed
costs in smaller companies, and more
concern among smaller employers about
trained employees being hired away by
competitors. However, opposite results have
been reported as well. When distinguishing
between manufacturing and non-manu-
facturing US establishments, Lynch and
Black (1998) obtained an inverse relationship
between employer size and the proportion of
employees being trained in the non-manufac-
turing sector; that is, smaller non-manufac-
turing establishments were found to train a
greater proportion of their workforce than
were the sector’s larger establishments.
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training is typically lower for temporary employees, the amount of training received, once trained, is not auto-
matically lower than for permanently employed colleagues. 
15. In a majority of the investigated EU countries, part-timers and full-timers have been found to be equally like-
ly to start training.
16. For a positive union effect, see e.g. Green, Machin and Wilkinson (1999), Booth, Francesconi and Zoega
(2003), and Böheim and Booth (2004).Substantial differences in the provision of
formal training programmes are also evident
across single industries. A conspicuous
feature here is the markedly lower incidence
of company-provided training in low-skill/
low-pay industries in both manufacturing
(e.g. textiles) and services (e.g., wholesale and
retail trade, hotels and restaurants), even after
controlling for a broad set of personal and
employer characteristics.17
Few studies have been able to cover other
characteristics of the employers. For UK and
US companies and establishments there is
some evidence of the use of high-perform-
ance work systems and a high degree of capi-
tal intensity exerting a positive influence on
the existence of formal training pro-
grammes.18 Large investments in physical
capital and R&D, as well as the adoption of
new forms of work organisation also tend to
encourage higher percentages of employees to
be given formal training. 
Furthermore, despite the theoretically
asserted crucial association between techno-
logical progress and training (e.g. in
Acemoglu 1997), few studies have explored
this link empirically. Empirical research on
this issue is all the more important, as no
clear prediction on the sign of the relation-
ship between technological change and
investment in training can be derived from
economic theory.19 According to a study by
Bartel and Sicherman (1998) using US data
on young males employed in manufacturing,
production workers in manufacturing indus-
tries with a high rate of technological change
are more likely to receive formal company
training than are their colleagues employed in
manufacturing industries characterised by
low levels of technological change.20 The
corresponding results for non-production
young males point to no significant overall
differences in formal company training across
industries differing in their rate of techno-
logical change. Their results further indicate
that, although the more educated have a
higher probability of being trained, the train-
ing gap between less- and better-educated
workers tends to narrow at higher levels of
technological change, a finding that holds
true for both production and non-produc-
tion workers. This situation is explained to
emerge because of the substitutability
between a higher education and training is
stronger than their complementarity, which
favours more training for the less skilled. In
other words, the more educated are seen to be
more adaptable to new technologies than
their less-educated counterparts21, who
accordingly need more training. The results
of Bartel and Sicherman (1998) also suggest
that higher rates of technological change
increase the pool of trainees; that is, compa-
nies are more likely to train those who did
not receive training in the previous period.
Technological change does not, however,
seem to increase the number of hours spent
in training (Bartel and Sicherman 1995).
As a final remark concerning the
incidence and intensity of company training,
it may be noted that few studies have
attempted to link companies’ decisions to
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17. For recent evidence on the training situation of the low skilled employed in the service sector, as well as a brief
overview of the current state-of-knowledge on this issue, see e.g. Asplund and Salverda (2004).
18. For the UK, see Addison and Belfield (2004), and for the USA, e.g. Lynch and Black (1998) and the refer-
ences therein.
19. For a brief discussion of the theory aspect, see e.g. Bartel and Sicherman (1998).
20. It may be noted that the role of the rate of technological change is maintained when controlling for differences
in the level of technology across manufacturing industries.
21. Evidence in support of this contention was provided already in 1987 by Bartel and Lichtenberg.invest in training to explicit reasons or
objectives for undertaking these investments,
such as new technology or workplace re-
organisation. Information on the major
reasons underlying companies’ investment in
their employees has so far been mostly
obtained indirectly, through the inclusion of
company-specific characteristics as deter-
minants of training incidence and intensity.
One attempt in this vein is a recent study by
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002)
based on, inter alia, a survey of organisation-
al practices and labour force characteristics
conducted in 1995 and 1996 among senior
human resource managers in large US com-
panies. One finding was that companies with
high levels of information technology and
workplace organisation invest highly in train-
ing irrespective of whether or not they have
already invested heavily in human capital.
Moreover, this complementarity between
new technology and human capital invest-
ment policies seems to be a within-sector
effect rather than one arising merely from
cross-sector differences in production
processes.
Turnover effects of and on company
training
Both human capital and internal labour
market theories predict a negative relation-
ship between specific training and turnover.22
According to the human capital model
(Becker 1964), both the employee and the
employer have an incentive to maintain a
long-term employment relationship in order
to realise a return on their shared investment.
Since the period available to recoup such an
investment lengthens if the employee is
trained earlier, specific training can be
expected to be negatively associated with
tenure on the job. The internal labour market
theory, developed by Doeringer and Piore
(1985), in turn advocates that the higher the
company’s need of specific skills and,
accordingly, its training costs, the more
motivated the company is to structure its
internal labour market to discourage turnover
among its employees. In a similar vein, more
recent theories focussing on the re-organisa-
tion of production, work and companies,
with the ultimate goal of improving the
capability to respond to new technology and
increased competitive pressures, emphasise
the role of training as well as of other
strategies to increase commitment to the
workplace and, hence, to discourage turn-
over.23
A common feature of these theoretical
strands is that the company’s efforts to reduce
turnover are taken to be driven by its need 
to impart specific skills. However, this
presumed negative association between
company-provided training and turnover has
recently been given an alternative interpreta-
tion: it should rather be seen as reflecting the
relationship between general training and
turnover in a non-competitive labour market
setting characterised by limited mobility (e.g.
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22. In a competitive labour market, there is no specific relationship between general training and turnover, since
the employee bears all the costs of the training and decides whether to remain or quit without incurring any
costs in the process of going to work for another company.
23. For a brief review of the theoretical literature on work organisation mechanisms and human resource manage-
ment practices, see e.g. Asplund and Oksanen (2003).
24. Finally, a recent paper by Diaz-Vazquez and Snower (2003) may also be mentioned in this context. They derive
a theoretical model showing how company-based specific on-the-job training changes the effects of firing costs
on employment. Their model predicts that the effect of such training causes firing costs to have a contrac-
tionary influence on average employment, when looking over the whole business cycle. The authors argue that Chang and Wang 1996).24 Existing empirical
evidence on the association between the pro-
vision of training and subsequent turnover is
mixed in the sense that some results point to
a significantly negative relationship (e.g.
Parent 1999) while others indicate that the
relationship is negative but non-significant
(e.g. Krueger and Rouse 1998).
When it comes to the impact of turnover
on training, the relationship is, in theory,
ambiguous (e.g. Frazis, Gittleman and Joyce,
2000). Thus, employees who are perceived to
have a high probability of leaving the
company are less likely to receive employer-
provided training. Simultaneously, as noted
above, the benefits from training are expect-
ed to be highest in the case of employees with
short tenure on the job. Additionally, train-
ing might increase an employee’s probability
of leaving the employer. In other words, the
company faces an obvious risk of having its
trained employees hired away – ‘poached’ –
by other companies that also value the new
skills that these trained employees have
acquired through their current employer’s
investment in them. Indeed, using US
establishment-level data, Frazis, Gittleman
and Joyce (2000) found turnover to have a
negative effect on some but not all their
measures of training. Booth, Francesconi and
Zoega (2003), in turn, showed that the high-
er the average quit rate in a UK industry, the
less likely is a full-time male employed in the
industry to receive general training, and the
fewer are the training days, if trained.
However, they also found that unionised full-
time male employees have a lower quit rate
than non-unionised colleagues, which is seen
to be due to unions raising the relative wages
of their members. This, in turn, induces the
company to provide more training in the
general skills of its employees as well.
Additionally, an earlier UK study of the
link between training and job-to-job
mobility (Dearden et al., 1997) showed that
training-sponsoring employers typically face
a lower-than-average probability of losing
their trained employees in the next year
compared to employers who do not provide
their employees with training. The authors
interpreted this finding to indicate that
employers are inclined to train the employees
they wish to retain. Previous job mobility
seems to leave the probability of receiving
training roughly unaffected. The exception to
this is a very recent job move, which tends to
induce a higher training probability, probably
mainly due to induction training. These
findings hold for both men and women. Also
in the UK, Green et al. (2000) found that
mobility tends to decline with the degree of
firm-specificity of the acquired skills, the
extent of company sponsorship of the train-
ing, and training aimed at raising the
employee’s commitment to the company. But
for the majority of cases, the two mobility-
expectations-of-training measuring surveys
used in the analysis point to training having
no significant impact on mobility.
A higher turnover of labour has occasion-
ally been put forth as an explanation to why
the US economy generates less training than
many other OECD economies (e.g. Blinder
and Krueger 1996). This contention of a neg-
ative relation between turnover and the level
of training is, however, refuted by Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998). In particular, they
argued that if companies provide and pay for
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the stated interdependence between companies’ hiring and firing decisions can attribute the relatively weak job
creation experienced in many OECD countries to skill-biased technological change occurring in combination
with restrictive job security legislation.skills of a more general nature (as was earlier
shown to be the case), then the differing
amounts of general training across countries
cannot be explained by exogenous differences
in turnover alone. 
Wage effects of company training
As already noted, the standard human capital
model distinguishes between general and
specific training. Companies bear none of the
costs of general training; the employees
entirely finance their accumulation of gener-
al skills themselves by accepting a lower wage
during the training period, but also collect all
the returns on their training investment
through higher post-training wage growth.
Simultaneously, the economy achieves a
socially optimal level of training. If the
employees face imperfections in the form of,
for instance, credit constraints, the training
investment level will, due to the absence of
company financing, fall short of the social
optimum. This classical situation changes,
however, if the training is in some part
specific to the company, or if there are
frictions in the labour market that provide
the company with incentives to share the cost
of general training.25 In that case, the
obtained return on training will under-
estimate the wage effect of the investment in
terms of productivity (see further e.g. Frazis
and Loewenstein, 2003).
A broad number of studies report partici-
pation in employer-provided training to have
a significantly positive impact on the wages
of the trained employees, while much less is
still known about the wage effects of the
intensity of the training.26,27 Since not all
employees are equally likely to obtain train-
ing, employer-provided training thus stands
out as a potentially key contributor to wage
and earnings inequality, further boosted by
the complementarity between education and
training posited earlier.28 Conversely, training
offers one key tool when trying to combat
rising wage inequality in general, and
improve the labour market situation of the
low-skilled in particular. But, as emphasised
by Lynch (1995:57): “Training for training’s
sake will not eliminate the wage gap.” 
In recent years, however, the existing
evidence of a strong positive association
between company-provided training and the
subsequent wages of the trainees has been
questioned due to the obvious problem that
training is not necessarily randomly distri-
buted to employees. More specifically,
standard Mincer-type wage equations to
which a dummy indicator for participation in
training is added as an explanatory variable
are seen to generate biased estimates of the
wage effects of training whenever the
employee’s and/or the employer’s decision
affects who is getting trained, and who is
not.29 The literature contains a few examples,
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25. See the discussion above in the section on general versus specific training. 
26. For overviews of previous evidence on the wage effects of company training, see e.g. Bishop (1997), Barrett et
al. (1998) and Cohn and Addison (1998).
27. Studies approximating returns to general human capital by labour market experience and returns to specific
human capital by tenure have been overlooked in this context. 
28. See further e.g. Groot and Maassen Van den Brink (2003). Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2003b), in turn,
argued that at least some of the documented differences in wage inequality across EU countries could be
explained by the complementarity between education and training systems.
29. See e.g. Frazis and Loewenstein (2003) and Schøne (2004) for a comprehensive discussion of potential econo-
metric problems when estimating the wage effects of training investments. These problems include unobserved
heterogeneity in wage levels as well as in wage growth, unobserved heterogeneity in returns to training, and
measurement errors, among others.where attempts have been made to account
for the unobserved heterogeneity between
individuals that underlies this selectivity bias,
using standard techniques – Heckman-type
selection models, instrumental variable
methods, and fixed-effects estimators.30
Frazis and Loewenstein (2003) were left with
a return on training in the USA that is 
several times the return on formal schooling
even after correcting for unobserved hetero-
geneity as well as a set of other confounding
factors. However, their results also indicate
that the return on training declines substan-
tially with the quantity of training; that is,
the highest returns are reaped from relatively
short spells of training. Booth and Bryan
(2002), controlling for time-invariant hetero-
geneity using fixed effects techniques, found
the wage gains from participation in
company training in the UK to be positive
and persistent. For France, in contrast,
controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity
generates statistically non-significant wage
effects from company training (Goux and
Maurin 2000). Evidence for Norway
indicates that controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity reduces the estimated wage
effect to the still significant but minor mag-
nitude of approximately one per cent
(Schøne 2004).31 The existing evidence for
Germany is inconclusive; while Pischke
(2001) found no evidence of work-related
training leading to higher wages in
Germany32, Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003)
reported the wage effects of participation in
company training to be positive even after
correction for the endogeneity of training.
Still another technique has been suggested
by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002), the basic
idea of which is to narrow down the typical
comparison group of all non-participants to
those who were to participate in training, but
were not able to do so due to some random
event. This approach leads to an estimated
wage return on participation in company-
provided formal training in the Netherlands
that is close to zero. The authors noted that
this finding of no wage effects whatsoever
from participation in company training is in
line with previous results of theirs based on
instrumental variable methods (Leuven and
Oosterbeek 2001). They concluded by
arguing that what is interpreted as returns to
training seems, for the most part, to be a
return to unobservable characteristics. 
Considerably more conformity in report-
ed results seems to characterise the wage
effects of company training received at previ-
ous employers. Thus Booth and Bryan
(2002) found for the UK that employer-
financed training increases wages both at the
current employer and at future employers,
with the wage premium being substantially
higher at future employers, especially for
accredited training.33 They note that these
results are well in line with previous findings
for the UK. Furthermore, they found a
similar pattern of effects for the time spent in
training. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998,
1999) also found company-provided training
received at previous employers to exert a pos-
itive and persistent influence on wages in the
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20. For a brief review of these studies, see e.g. Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002).
31. Schøne (2004), however, found even this size of the wage effect to be relatively high in view of the typically
short duration of training in Norway (an average number of training days among participants of approximate-
ly 11 days). Furthermore, he estimated a doubling (an increase of 100 per cent) of the number of training days
to increase hourly wages by 1.1 per cent. When applying fixed-effects estimation techniques, the wage effect
of the number of training days drops considerably and, while significant, is only slightly more than zero.
32. Instead Pischke (2001) found training during leisure time to exert a significantly positive effect on wages. 
33. Indeed, non-accredited training was found to exert no impact whatsoever on wages in future jobs.USA. In contrast to the UK findings, how-
ever, they obtained no, or only weak,
evidence in support of general company
training raising wages also at the employer
providing the training, although this effect
reveals a tendency to strengthen over time,
according to results by Lengermann (1999).
Negligible returns on general training
provided by the training company, but large
returns when changing employers, are results
that seem to also hold true for full-time Swiss
males employed in large companies (Gerfin
2004). For those employed in small
companies, on the other hand, there is no
notable difference between the return on
general training reaped by those who stay in
the company providing the training and
those who move to work in another com-
pany. These findings of the return on training
being typically larger at future employers are
well in line with the predictions of the new
theoretical models of training in frictional
labour markets. 
Another aspect related to the wage effects
of company-sponsored training, receiving
growing attention in the empirical training
literature, is the question of whether the
return on training investment stays the same
across the whole of the wage distribution, as
assumed in standard wage regressions.
Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2004b)
used ECHP data for non-agricultural private-
sector men aged 25 to 54 in ten EU countries
to test the validity of this assumption. Their
major finding was that in the vast majority of
the investigated countries, the return on
company training does not change signifi-
cantly across the conditional wage distri-
bution. Belgium stands out as the only
notable exception in this respect. This simi-
larity in results across the EU countries does
not extend to mean wage returns on training,
though. On the contrary, the mean returns
vary considerably across the ten EU countries
in the study. In particular, the highest average
return was in Ireland, and the lowest, or zero,
in Italy and the Netherlands, with the Dutch
result thus being well in line with the afore-
mentioned findings of Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2001, 2002). Comparatively
low average returns were also apparent for the
countries with the highest incidence of
company training – Britain, Denmark and
Finland. 
Surprisingly minor attention has been
paid to the question whether, and how, the
wage effects of investments in company
training vary with the characteristics of the
trained employees. Recent contributions by
Regnér (2002) for Sweden and by Kuckulenz
and Zwick (2003) for Germany shed some
further light on these issues.34 Their findings
confirm, by and large, a priori expectations
while simultaneously offering insight on
additional dimensions. The Swedish findings
reveal that the wage effects are larger for
employees in jobs that require long training,
for the recently hired, and for those receiving
general as opposed to specific training, but
only if employed in the private sector.
Indeed, specific training caused significant
wage effects for public-sector employees only,
which contrasts sharply with the Norwegian
results, which showed no significant
difference in the return on general and specif-
ic training in the private sector (Barth 1997).
The German results suggest that highly-
skilled employees reap greater benefits from
training than their low-skilled colleagues, the
return on training is higher for job entrants
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34. For other similar studies, see e.g. Lynch (1992) for the USA, Blundell, Dearden and Meghir (1996) for the UK,
and Pannenberg (1997) for Germany.than for tenured employees, and employees
with a permanent job contract get higher
returns from training than those employed
on a temporary basis. In contrast to these
German results, Ok and Tergeist (2003)
obtained no evidence from ECHP data in
support of the impact of training on wages
being significantly different between low-
educated and high-educated employees.
Evidence from the UK, in turn, indicates
that unionised employees tend to gain more
from investments in company-sponsored
(general) training than their non-unionised
counterparts (Booth, Francesconi and
Zoega, 2003). Moreover, this advantage of
unionised over non-unionised employees
also extends to the duration of the training,
although the overall wage effect of training
duration is small.35
A cautious generalisation about formal
versus informal training would be that indi-
viduals tend to gain a positive private return
from off-the-job training. Recent evidence
from Germany, reported by Kuckulenz and
Zwick (2003), indicates that participation in
‘external’ training has a significantly positive
effect on wages, while the wage return on
participation in ‘internal’ training is non-sig-
nificant. These findings are in line with those
reported by e.g. Barron, Berger and Black
(1997) for the impact of ‘off-site’ versus ‘on-
site’ company training on starting wages in
the USA. On the other hand, when com-
paring youth training in Australia, the UK
and the USA, Tan et al. (1992) found that in
all three countries, training provided within
the company offered larger returns than
training provided outside the company (i.e.,
off-the-job). 
Productivity effects of company
training
The effects of employer-provided training on
company productivity have typically been
evaluated indirectly by means of its impact
on wages. A major shortcoming of such an
approach, however, is that wages are suitable
as a direct measure of productivity only in a
traditional neoclassical labour market; that is,
in a labour market with perfectly competitive
wages. As noted in the previous section, in
situations where both the costs and the bene-
fits of the training investment are shared by
the employee and the employer, the result is
an underestimation of the wage effect in
terms of productivity. Often the estimated
return on training is then interpreted as a
lower-bound estimate of the wage effect.
A slowly growing literature attempts to
measure the productivity effects of company
training directly, typically through the use of
standard Cobb–Douglas production func-
tions. A common feature of earlier studies in
this field is rather weak evidence in support
of the existence of a clear-cut, non-negligible
positive association between company train-
ing and productivity.36 Just as in the case of
effects on wages from training, one reason for
this ambiguous outcome is that the estimated
positive productivity impacts tend to dis-
appear once the endogeneity of training is
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35. It is also noteworthy that recent evidence for UK establishments, as reported by Forth and Millward (2004),
suggests that the wage effects of the duration of training are non-linear. More specifically, they find that the pos-
itive relation between training duration and wages is associated with certain training durations (one to two days,
and two to five days) when compared to a situation of no training.
36. Previous studies of the productivity effects of employer-provided training are mostly based on various perform-
ance measures (subjective as well as more objective ones) for rather specific samples of companies. Moreover,
a majority of the studies concern the USA. See e.g. Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000).corrected for. The last few years, however,
have seen several interesting contributions to
this emerging research field.37
A study by Dearden, Reed and Van
Reenen (2000) based on a panel of British
industries covering the years 1983 to 1996
reported that training significantly boosts
productivity and, moreover, to a much larger
degree than indicated in previous studies
focusing entirely on the wage effects of train-
ing. The underestimation of the productivity
effects of company training is argued to be
due to two major circumstances. Firstly,
companies usually make training decisions
for some particular reason(s), such as negative
demand shocks or low productivity, implying
that training should be treated as an
endogenous factor instead of being taken as
exogenously determined. Secondly, their
estimated wage effects of training are found
to be only about half of those on industrial
productivity.38 Addison and Belfield (2004)
reported a positive impact from (instru-
mented) training on both labour productivi-
ty and financial performance in British
private-sector establishments with at least 10
employees. An advantage of their study is
that they explore the impact not only of the
incidence of training but also of the duration
and coverage of training. A disadvantage is
that they are restricted to the use of subjective
measures of labour productivity and financial
performance obtained from management
questionnaires. 
Hempell (2003) recently reported a posi-
tive productivity effect of training for the
service sector in Germany based on data
covering the period from 1994 to 1998.
Positive, albeit rather modest, productivity
effects were noted in the Swedish machine
tool industry in a study by Kazamaki
Ottersten, Lindh and Mellander (1999).
They explain the small productivity impacts
of company-sponsored training by second-
order effects compared to the estimated first-
order effects of company training expendi-
tures yielding substantial cost savings in the
long run. Black and Lynch (1996), finally,
found no impact of training on sales in
private US establishments with more than 20
employees, but noted that their measures of
training (number of employees involved in
training in, respectively, 1990 and 1993)
obviously underestimate the true return.
When they accounted for other dimensions
of training, their evidence becomes more
compelling. More specifically, the produc-
tivity effect appears to be strongly dependent
on the proportion of time spent in formal
off-the-job training (for manufacturing) and
also on the content of the training pro-
grammes (for non-manufacturing). All in all,
focusing merely on the wage effects of train-
ing overlooks the fact that companies profit
substantially from the training they provide
their employees.
A limited number of mostly US studies
have tried to move one step further, in the
direction of evaluating the employer’s inter-
nal rate of return on investment (ROI) in
formal company training. These studies were
recently reviewed by Bartel (2000:522), who
concluded that the ROI in training might be
“much higher than previously believed”.
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37. For an informative summary table of recent contributions to the ‘training-in-the-production-function’ litera-
ture, see Addison and Belfield (2004, Appendix Table 1).
38. A roughly 50–50 split of the benefits of training between employees and employers was also reported by
Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989) based on company-level data for the USA. In a more recent study of
US employer-reported data, however, Barron, Berger and Black (1997) found the estimated effect on produc-
tivity growth to be approximately ten times the effect on wage growth.Nevertheless, the existing evidence provides
neither companies nor policy-makers with
much guidance on the magnitude of the
employer’s rate of ROI in training. She
emphasises that, especially in case of under-
investment problems, the ROI in training
could guide companies in their investment
decisions, and policy makers in their
decisions on subsidies to company training.
A major reason for the limited information
on employers’ ROI in training is lack of data
on the employers’ training costs in company-
level and establishment-level data sets. This
explains why the focus has usually been
limited to productivity effects.
Finally, Collier et al. (2003) took an
indirect approach to assessing the impact of
training investment on company perform-
ance by exploiting the link between training
and commercial survival, using panel data on
nine occupational groups within British
establishments. Their results suggested that,
while no occupational group reveals a nega-
tive association between training and sur-
vival, certain occupational groups do stand
out in the sense that increasing their training
improves substantially the establishment’s
chances of survival. The picture is, however,
complicated by the fact that these occu-
pational groups are not the same across estab-
lishments, but differ notably between larger
and smaller establishments.
Finally, while the existing evidence points
to significantly positive productivity effects
from external or general training, the effects
of internal or specific training are typically
estimated to be negligible. Results pointing
in these directions have been obtained by
Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000) for
the UK, Barrett and O’Connell (2001) for
Ireland and Zwick (2002) for Germany. It is
hypothesised that this outcome is due to
more formal company training having a more
lasting impact on productivity.
Societal effects of company-provided
training
Empirical evidence in support of the exis-
tence of noteworthy positive external effects
from investment in human capital is weak.
While there is an emerging literature focus-
ing on spillovers from investments in formal
education39, few studies can say something
concrete about training spillovers. Since the
Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000) study
focuses on the effects of training on industry
productivity, the results appear to capture at
least some of the externalities that can be
expected to arise from company-provided
training. According to the authors, such
positive externalities may offer an explana-
tion for the comparatively large effects of
training that they obtained from data on
British industries.
Another strand of research departs from
the predictions of standard economic theory,
according to which employers will not invest
in general training and will under-invest in
specific training, unless appropriate policy
measures are taken. This negative impact on
the training behaviour of companies is caused
by the obvious risk of competitors hiring
away (poaching) the trained employees. The
overall consequence is underinvestment in
company training, as too few employees are
trained and the intensity of the provided
training is too low. These market failures,
which are taken to be present especially in the
case of more general training, are thus due to
the companies’ discount rate exceeding the
social discount rate. In their theoretical
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39. See e.g. Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003), and Asplund (2004).model focusing on investment in general
human capital on-the-job in an imperfectly
competitive labour market, Booth, Zoega
and Francesconi (1999) showed that trade
unions may affect this ‘quitting externality’
by increasing the training intensity, but at the
expense of a lower number of employees
being trained. Hence, there is both a positive
and a negative effect on social welfare.
Moreover, they obtain support for the predic-
tions of their model from the analysis of full-
time male employees using British panel data
for the years 1991 to 1996.
The need for government subsidies
arising from poaching externalities and
underinvestment in general company train-
ing has also been analysed in a theoretical
paper by Moen and Rosen (2002). In sharp
contrast with previous literature, however,
they concluded that internal efficiency is a
sufficient condition for an efficient allocation
of resources in an economy characterised by
endogenous human capital formation and
endogenous turnover in the presence of
search friction. Internal efficiency can be
achieved either through long-term binding
contracts or efficient bargaining between
employers and employees.40 Underinvest-
ment in general training due to excessive
turnover appears to arise in the absence of
internal efficiency; that is, if employers do
not set wages for experienced employees in a
competitive way, but instead drive them too
low in order to maximise profits. But even in
this latter case, the social and private returns
on investments in general training continue
to coincide, and subsidies on general training
would cause a reduction in welfare in this
case as well. The authors argued that any sub-
sidies should, at least, be combined with
some additional policy measures aimed at
reducing turnover.
Indeed, Moen and Rosen’s (2002) theory
of ‘persistent’ equality between the social and
the private return on investment in general
company training stands in sharp contrast to
several – both theoretical and empirical –
contributions arguing in favour of subsidies
for general company training. It sharply con-
tradicts the theoretical predictions of Stevens
(1994), who argued that poaching creates a
wedge between the social and the private
return on investment in general company
training, as long as the productivity of
employees exceeds their wages. In line with
these arguments, Booth and Snower (1996)
argued in favour of subsidies for general
company training in order to mitigate the
market failures caused by poaching.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) and Gersbach
and Schmutzler (2003) presented theoretical
arguments justifying subsidisation of general
company training. Ballot and Taymaz (2001)
ran experiments to test the efficiency of a
number of alternative training policies for
long-term macroeconomic performance, and
concluded in favour of subsidy policies.
Government subsidies to counteract the
under-investment tendencies caused by
poaching externalities have also been suggest-
ed by the OECD (1994, 2003).
A different mechanism has been high-
lighted by Leuven et al. (2002). More specif-
ically, they argued that in case workers are
sufficiently motivated by reciprocity, then the
amount of investment in both general and
specific company training will be optimal
also from a social point of view. In contrast 
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40. Acemoglu (1997), in contrast, found that turnover in the presence of search frictions creates positive externali-
ties from investment in general company training for future employers. As a consequence, internal efficiency,
such as long-term contracts with current employers, cannot offset the risk of underinvestment in general com-
pany training.to the standard-model opportunistically-
behaving individual, a reciprocal employee is
characterised by a willingness to give most, or
all, of the return on the training investment
to the employer. Using a representative
sample of the Dutch population, Leuven et
al. (2002) obtained strong support for their
proposed mechanism; that is, companies did
not seem to under-invest in specific training
and invested substantially in the general
training of their workforce. In their training
behaviour, companies show a clear preference
to provide training to employees with a high
sensitivity to reciprocity.
All in all, our current knowledge on the
existence and magnitude of training market
failures, on the one hand, and their causes
and consequences, on the other, leaves a
multitude of crucial questions unanswered.
Among these are the need for and the most
efficient mode of public intervention. The
complexity of these open questions is further
highlighted by the fact that there does not
seem to exist a common solution for all
countries and all situations. Instead, public
intervention policies should be tailored, in a
cost-efficient way, to fit the specific needs
that exist in each country. This is certainly a
challenging task, which is also clearly evident
from a recent evaluation of policy measures
proposed for stimulating on-the-job training
in the Netherlands (van Leeuwen and van
Praag, 2002). More specifically, there appear
to be large differences in the cost-effective-
ness of policy measures, and the outcome of
measures may differ substantially among
employers, employees, and the govern-
ment.
Discussion and conclusions
It seems fair to summarise by arguing that
only cautious conclusions can be drawn
based on the current state-of-knowledge
concerning the incidence, extent, and impact
of company investment in training. Among
these conclusions are the following. 
• There is a confusing multitude of defini-
tions of company training in use in the
empirical literature. Apart from the tradi-
tional concepts of ‘general’ versus ‘specif-
ic’ training, the literature contains a grow-
ing number of competing concepts such
as ‘formal’ versus ‘informal’ training,
‘external’ versus ‘internal’ training, and
‘off-site’ versus ‘on-site’ training. The
conceptual confusion is further increased
by the fact that on-the-job training is
often used to cover both general and
specific training. Additionally, the term
appears in a commonly utilised way to
distinguish between formal and informal
company training on the basis of the loca-
tion of the training (training provided
‘off-the-job’ compared to ‘on-the-job’).41
These examples clearly show that there is
an obvious need to clarify how to correct-
ly label the different modes of company-
provided training. The current situation
undermines the comparison of results
both across countries and within single
countries. It also hampers the emergence
of a more broad-based picture of the
economic role of employers’ investment
in training.
• The existing empirical evidence states that
companies do – and should – provide and
pay also for the general training of their
employees. This willingness of employers
to invest in the more general skills of their
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41. Another frequently used alternative when trying to distinguish between formal and informal company training
is to depart from the formality versus informality of the provided training, irrespective of its location.workforce has been shown to rely on the
possibility to earn rents on their trained
employees as – due to (labour) market
imperfections – the wages of the trainees
grow more slowly than their productivity.
These findings stand in sharp contrast to
the predictions of the standard general-
versus-specific training theory. 
• The research on the provision of company
training is heavily biased towards partici-
pation versus non-participation in com-
pany-provided training, while correspon-
ding results on the role of the intensity of
training and for different modes of train-
ing are mostly lacking. Moreover, most of
the existing empirical evidence concerns
more formal modes of company training,
while our current knowledge about the
incidence, intensity, and effects of infor-
mal company training is scarce, often
contradictory, and mostly lacking. A
major explanation of this situation is that
the existing microdata contain little, if
any, information on informal training.
• The empirical research has succeeded in
identifying a broad number of individual
and job-related characteristics that affect
an employee’s probability of receiving
employer-provided training. Many of
these finding are already labelled ‘stylised
facts’. However, several of these stylised
facts can be questioned based on more
recent results. For example, better cover-
age of employer-related background
characteristics suggests that the educa-
tion–training association is not necessari-
ly so clear-cut as indicated in earlier stud-
ies. Likewise, union wage formation does
not seem to have the detrimental impact
on work-related training that it is com-
monly alleged to have.
• One generalisation seems to hold,
though: the less skilled are mostly in a less
advantageous position when it comes to
company training. For instance, employ-
ers engaged in sectors employing a dispro-
portionately large amount of low-skilled
labour are found to be the least likely to
provide training in basic general skills,
although these low-skilled employees are
exactly the ones that would need and also
benefit most from such training. Since the
training opportunities of the low-skilled
are likely to be affected by a combination
of labour market imperfections, credit
constraints, and training market failures, a
recent OECD report (2003) emphasised
the need to adopt co-financing policies in
order to improve the incentives of com-
panies to invest in the training of their
employees in general and of their less-
advantaged employees in particular.
• The link between education and training
is crucial also from a broader perspective,
since our knowledge on the interactions
between formal education and employer-
provided training is still weak. Is there an
optimal mix of schooling and training?
How do the returns on training interact
with those of schooling? How does
employer-provided training interact with
other modes of adulthood schooling and
training?
• Empirical evidence on the economic
impact of employer investment in train-
ing is only just emerging. This situation is
remarkable in view of the enormous
amount of resources invested annually in
company training. So far, most of the
effort has been focused on the wage effects
of training but, simultaneously, better
data and/or more sophisticated estimation
techniques have generated an increasingly
more mixed picture of the wage returns
on training. Moreover, the reported wage
returns on training highlight, for the most
part, only average effects, while informa-
tion on the returns reaped by differently-
68 Rita Asplundendowed individuals is still more or less
missing. 
• It is often argued in the economics litera-
ture as well as in policy debates that train-
ing improves an individual’s employabili-
ty and career prospects. However, a closer
look at the existing empirical evidence
reveals that surprisingly little research has
been undertaken on these aspects and, as
a consequence, there is still only weak, if
any, empirical support for these argu-
ments.42 Indeed, it seems as if these con-
tentions have been derived indirectly
from the by now stylised ‘fact’ of a posi-
tive relationship between accumulated
work experience and wages, as well as the
evidence of those in a worse labour mar-
ket position having a significantly lower
probability of receiving employer-provid-
ed training.
• Only limited – and highly contradictory –
evidence is available on the question of
whether or not there are inefficiencies
(underinvestment) in the provision of
company training. Accordingly, the train-
ing literature provides little, if any, guid-
ance on the social return on company
investment in training, or on the need
and mode for public intervention. 
All in all, the growing interest in investigating
the incidence, determinants, and impacts 
of company-provided training, evidently
inspired by better data and more sophisti-
cated research techniques, has without doubt
substantially improved our current know-
ledge on the role and importance of the huge
amounts of money that companies annually
invest in the human capital of their employ-
ees. Simultaneously, however, as the topical
literature has increased, so has the confusion
surrounding this literature and the findings it
has generated so far. For instance, returns to
the employees in the form of wage growth
seem to be much more modest than indi-
cated by the earlier literature, whereas returns
to companies in the form of productivity
growth tend to be considerably larger than
previously thought.
Another conspicuous feature of the train-
ing literature is that it is still quite selective in
the sense that some questions have received
considerable attention, both theoretically and
empirically, while other aspects are so far
almost entirely overlooked. Moreover, our
knowledge about those questions to which
relatively much attention has been paid is still
quite heavily based on results concerning a
specific age group (e.g. young people), a
specific industry (e.g. manufacturing) or a
specific country (mostly the UK or the USA).
This reflects the fact that comprehensive
analyses of the incidence, content, extent and
effects of employer-provided training are still
heavily constrained by data limitations.
Indeed, it seems fair to conclude that the
extensive review by Lynch (1998) of what
current databases on employer-provided
training are lacking, is today as relevant as it
was in the late 1990s.
Taking all this together, our current
knowledge on the economic role of company
training demands great cautiousness in
drawing policy implications concerning the
crucial questions of the inequality of access to
company training, on the one hand, and
training market failures, on the other.
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42. There are, to my knowledge, few more recent empirical studies that explicitly analyse, based on broad data sets,
how company training tends to affect the employability, labour market mobility, and careers of individuals.
These include a few studies for Germany (see the references in Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003)) and an ECHP-
based study by Ok and Tergeist (2003).Literature
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